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Summary findings
Mattoo and Subramanian argue that India should engage perpetual hostage to vested interests or weak domestic
more actively in the multilateral trading system for four industries.
reasons: Third, engagement can help enforce India's market
First, such engagement could facilitate domestic access rights. If other countries do not eliminate quotas
reform and improve access to export markets. If the on textiles and clothing as scheduled, India can credibly
government could show that domestic reform would pay threaten to withdraw its obligations under the Agreement
off with increased access to markets abroad, those who on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
gain from such access - whether they export textiles, (TRIPs).
software, professional services, or other products - Fourth, multilateral tariff reduction could reduce the
could represent a countervailing voice to reform's disadvantage (to India) of not being part of regional
opponents. In turn, the need for this external payoff to agreements.
secure domestic reform makes India a credible bargainer, The value of multilateral engagement might be limited
which could induce trading partners to open their if the prospects for securing increased market access are
markets to India. dim, as the failed Seattle negotiations might appear to
Second, external commitments can foster good suggest. India must credibly test negotiating pessimism by
domestic policies, by providing guarantees against the showing its willingness to open its markets in return for
reversal of current policies or lending credibility to improved access to foreign markets. Success is not
promises of future reform. Such precommitments could certain, but India's chances are improved if it aligns itself
help strike a balance between the reluctance to unleash with countries pressing for sound policies of open trade.
competition immediately and the desire not to be held
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I. Introduction
One of the more commented upon facts about the Indian economy is its small and
dwindling importance in world trade. At independence, India accounted for over two
percent of world exports and imports, and by the early 1 990s, this share had declined to
about half a percent (Chart 1 below). A plausible case can be made that India's economic
fortunes have been related to this de facto international disengagement which is
attributable, at least in part, to India's inward looking economic and trade policies.
Protectionist polices, in turn, have shaped India's attitude to participation in the
multilateral trading system, both in the old GATT and its successor, the World Trading
Organization (WTO). India's stance in the GATT/WTO has always tended to be
defensive, seeking freedom to use restrictive policies, which has been one of the two
prongs of the so-called special and differential (S&D) treatment embraced by developing
countries as a whole. Since the early 1990s, India has embarked on serious trade and
economic reform, without, however, a corresponding change in the nature of its
multilateral engagement. This paper examines whether India should adopt a proactive
role in the multilateral arena founded on its recent adoption of more open policies.
Chart 1: India's Share in World Imports and Exports
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The collapse at Seattle of the negotiations to launch a new round provides time and
perspective for India to reassess more carefully its attitude toward the multilateral trade
system. The failed talks are both sobering and heartening in their lessons for India.
Sobering because of what failure signals about the external political and negotiating
environment. The hardening of partner country attitudes toward opening their own
1 The other prong was to seek preferential access for one's own exports in industrial country markets.
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markets and the emergence of insidious forms of protectionism will make the bargaining
climate less favorable for India in the future. Equally, however, Seattle demonstrates the
ability of developing countries to resist successfully these protectionist demands while
claiming the high ground and retaining legitimacy. Few, if any, observers have ascribed
the blame for the failed negotiations to developing country obstructionism.
Clearly, there are flaws in the structure of the multilateral system as well as limits to what
it can deliver, an observation reinforced by the events in Seattle. But Seattle should not
deflect attention from India's pressing need to reform domestically and to harness
multilateralism to this end. Multilateral engagement should be measured but broadly
active and supportive, rather than defensive.
Section II spells out the advantages of an active engagement strategy, while drawing
attention to its limits. Section III analyzes the issues that have emerged in some of the
negotiating areas in the WTO. Finally, section IV offers concrete proposals that Indian
negotiators might adopt in future discussions in the WTO. Section V concludes.
II. Multilateral Engagement: Whether and How
A major challenge facing India is how to institute and sustain good economic policies.
Above all this challenge is a domestic one. Good policy should be geared, first of all, to
injecting competition in the domestic economy. In the area of goods, this will involve
reduction in trade barriers; in services, competition requires also eliminating barriers to
entry. But good policy for both goods and services also includes judicious regulation,
both to remedy market failures and to achieve social objectives efficiently.
It is clear that multilateral engagement cannot be an end-in-itself. Domestic policy
priorities cannot be subordinated to the needs of such engagement nor must domestic
reform be held entirely hostage to external bargaining imperatives. The important
question is whether multilateral engagement can be harnessed to serve the ends of good
domestic policies. Can it contribute meaningfully to overall policy reform, and if so
how?
Multilateral engagement and the consequent international commitments undertaken by
countries necessarily entails a loss in sovereignty-the freedom that countries have to
make unconstrained choices. Globalization is ultimately a process of erosion of
sovereignty induced by conscious policy actions or forced by market and technological
developments. But sovereignty is not an absolute, overwhelming consideration that
should trump all others. It can be partially and strategically ceded to further domestic
policy reform and to secure an open trading system, which India, as a large and growing
trader, has some ability to shape. A number of factors argue in favor of a reassessment of
its approach to sovereignty and to the terms of its multilateral engagement.
A. Engagement as facilitating domestic reform and enhancing access through credible
bargaining
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The GATT/WTO is a quintessentially mercantilist bargaining framework where
concessions to open each other's markets are exchanged. These concessions are legally
binding commitments not to make policies affecting market access more restrictive than a
certain stated level. Thus, a country may commit not to raise its tariffs on bananas above
20% or commit to allow at least 5 foreign banks to enter its market. It is important to
recognize that actual conditions of access may be, and often are, more liberal than those
which are legally bound - actual tariffs on bananas may be only 10% and more than 5
foreign banks may actually be allowed to enter. Traders and investors value both the
actual liberalization of markets and the legal guarantee of access.
In order to see when multilateral engagement can both facilitate domestic reforms and
make it possible to extract concessions from trading partners, it is useful to examine three
situations.
If a country is wedded to self-sufficiency, as India and other developing countries were
until recently, it cannot be a bargainer. If you are not willing to open your markets, you
do not have the most obvious means of inducing your trading partners to do so. Under the
so-called special and differential treatment (S&D), developing countries sought, indeed
could only seek, limited preferential access as supplicants, because of their own
unwillingness to liberalize, rather than genuine non-preferential access as equal partners.2
Paradoxically, if a country is credibly committed to reform and can successfully
implement it, it cannot be a credible bargainer either. Partner countries can basically
free-ride on the internal commitment knowing that a refusal to engage in bargaining will
not alter their market access interests. The situation does not change much if a reformer
proceeds with liberalization unilaterally but refuses to bind the openness under the WTO
in the hope of extracting concessions. This is because the value to partner countries of a
binding by a credible reformer such as Singapore or Chile is small given the low
probability of policy reversal.
A third situation, and one that applies to India in the current context, arises in relation to a
willing reformer whose ability to implement reform is constrained by domestic
opposition. in this case, domestic reform could be facilitated if a government could
demonstrate that there were payoffs, in terms of increased access abroad, to domestic
opening. The gainers from the increased access, be it exporters of textiles, software,
professional services or other products, could represent a countervailing voice to groups
(import-competing industries) resistant to reform. How effective such a strategy could be
for Indian policymakers is unclear, but selling reform domestically should be that much
easier if some external payoffs can be demonstrated.
China's recent agreement with the US on its accession to the WTO illustrates this
political economy at work. In fact, in China's case, the external payoff, at least in the US
market, is really not increased access, but securing existing access as it already receives
2 Of course, this suited the protectionist interests in industrial countries because it allowed them to
procrastinate on the liberalization of the two sectors where developing countries had intrinsic comparative
advantage-agriculture and textiles.
5
MFN status in the US?3 China considers that its task of domestic reform is easier to sell
and implement by pointing merely to increased security of existing access.
Crucially, the need for improved foreign access to facilitate domestic reform (by easing
the domestic political constraints) makes a country a more credible bargainer and enables
it to extract more meaningful concessions from trading partners.4 A country can credibly
say, "if I get less, I can deliver less domestic liberalization" in a manner that neither an
unwilling reformer nor a wholly credible reformer can.
We would underscore here that the possibility of bargaining does not imply that unilateral
reform should be delayed or held back in order to secure market access benefits. Indeed,
much of the reform is likely to be implemented unilaterally. However, this process can
be facilitated by multilateral engagement, and to that extent, the latter becomes important
to address.
The distinction made above between altemative situations is important because there are
some who argue that India should focus on pushing domestic reform without necessarily
deepening its multilateral engagement. "Liberalize tariffs and investment unilaterally but
don't necessarily bind them" is a typical line taken by such observers. To us, such a view
is founded on a simplistic or overly sanguine view about the prerequisites for successful
reform. It renounces the use of forces that could be harnessed to secure domestic reform.
And it forsakes the possibility of credibly extracting concessions from trading partners.
B. Engagement as commitment to good policies
Of course, there is some value to multilateral engagement and ceding sovereignty even if
concessions cannot be extracted from partners. Sovereignty or the freedom to choose
could be the freedom to chose badly. Indian trade policy-making has been a sad
testament to bad unconstrained choices, choices that might have benefited from being
constrained. Such constraints foster good policies in two respects: providing guarantees
against reversal of current policies and facilitating future reform.
Even without harking back to the dirigiste days of the 1960s and 1970s, there have been
instances of policy reversal, which might have benefited from some loss of sovereignty
via a previous commitment to good policy. Despite undertaking commitments to bind
tariffs in the Uruguay Round in 1994, India availed itself of large amounts of flexibility
in the form of the wedge between the bound tariff and the actual tariff, particularly in
agriculture. In 1996 and 1997, the government, in the face of fiscal pressures, decided to
raise tariffs and use up some of the water in the tariff. From the government's
perspective, the decision to provide for a cushion or a margin of maneuver was
vindicated by its subsequent actions. But from a welfare perspective, this freedom that
Of course, this is an oversimplification because in some sectors such as textiles and clothing there will
arguably be increased access.
4 The Indian experience with TRIPS illustrates this point. The fact of the considerable domestic opposition
to higher patent protection brought home to trading partners the realization that without offsetting
compensation it would be extremely difficult for India to accede to their TRIPs demands.
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the government had was in fact counter-productive. Had the Uruguay Round bindings
been really binding, it would have forced the government to choose a superior instrument
- one that was neutral between imports and domestically produced goods - to meet its
fiscal needs.5
One reason for the reluctance of the Government to liberalize immediately is the
perceived need to protect the incumbent domestic suppliers from immediate competition
- either because of the infant industry type of argument or to facilitate "orderly exit".
And one reason for the failure of infant industry policies in the past, and the innumerable
examples of perpetual infancy, was the inability of the Government to commit itself
credibly to liberalize at some future date - either because it has a stake in the national
firm's continued operation, or because it is vulnerable to pressure from interest groups
which benefit from protection. The WTO offers a valuable mechanism to overcome this
difficulty. In the services negotiations, for instance, many governments precommitted to
future liberalization, thus striking a balance between the reluctance to unleash
competition immediately and the desire not to be held hostage in perpetuity to the
weakness of domestic industry or to vested interests. But India failed to take advantage
of this mechanism, and committed only to review its policies in basic
telecommunications at specified future dates.
C. Engagement as enforcement of rights
It is a truism that in a situation of asymmetry, a rules-based system protects, albeit
imperfectly, the weaker party. This is especially true when it comes to enforcement of
rules that have been already established. Warts and all, the WTO dispute settlement
system has lived up to this requirement in offering recourse to developing countries to
enforce their rights. Table 1 tabulates the complaints that have been notified in the WTO.
Developing countries account for about one-third of all the complaints and have been
defendants in forty percent of the complaints. Developing countries have won all the
cases that they have brought against the developed countries. India has successfully
prosecuted all three cases against developed country partners. The fact that developing
countries have been defendants in a lot of cases, even unsuccessful defendants, is actually
reaffirmation of the usefulness of the system as a safeguard, at least insofar as it reflects
reduced extra-systemic pressure. To settle disputes within the system affords greater
protection to the weaker party than settling outside it.
While the experience of dispute settlement affords some comfort, it could be argued that
on the really big issues, where real interests are at stake, there is still the possibility that
developing countries will be ineffective at enforcing their rights. The banana and
hormones disputes where compliance by larger trading partners has been delayed or
5There are several other examples of benefits from binding international rules. For instance, the recent
WTO rulings will lead to the elimination of quotas that India has for long and inappropriately maintained
for balance of payments reasons. Even though, India's commitments to phase out local content
requirements under the TRIMs agreement has not prevented the recent reimposition of such requirements
in the automobile sector, they could be challenged by partner countries.
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absent warrant caution. More generally there is the perception that developing countries'
ability to secure compliance by the larger traders is ultimately limited by the small size of
developing country markets and the consequential limited impact of any retaliatory
actions.
This problem acquires fresh urgency in the current international trading context because
of increasing fears that the quantitative restrictions imposed on textile products by
industrial countries will not be eliminated early in the next millennium as required by the
Uruguay Round textiles agreement. The stakes are high for India which should, given the
right domestic policy environment, stand to gain from the elimination of the quotas or
stand to lose if there is backtracking by trading partners. Do developing countries such as
India have the clout to ensure compliance with commitments or must they resign
themselves to ineffectiveness, believing that outcomes are beyond their ability to
influence? We argue below that India can wield an effective retaliatory weapon in the
form of its TRIPs obligations and should seriously consider changing its intellectual
property legislation to allow for this possibility.
D. Multilateral engagement as a bulwark against regionalism
There are very few multilateral traders left in this world and India has for the most part
been one of those lone battlers.6 Championing multilateralism is no longer a slogan
because its erosion through regional agreements is having a serious if unrecognized
impact on India's trade and could have similar consequences in the future. We provide a
particularly stark example below in relation to NAFTA. Multilateral tariffs must come
down if this policy-induced advantage is to be leveled and India therefore has a strong
interest in seeking to reduce tariffs on all industrial products including textiles and
clothing.
A future area of concern for multilateral traders is the proliferation of mutual recognition
agreements-whereby countries choose to accept the standards of some but not all
partner countries. These agreements are conceptually analogous to preferential trading
arrangements with all the possible adverse impacts on those countries that are excluded
from these agreements. Strengthening the provisions in goods and services on
preferential trading arrangements is overdue.
E. Negotiating pessimism
It is easy to be critical of the old obstructionist approach of developing countries which
was founded on a belief in self-sufficiency and inward-looking policies. But a more
complex question facing developing countries now is whether the liberal policies being
pursued at home need to be "multilateralized." Naysayers highlight the continuing
asymmetry of bargaining power, which affects agenda-setting and rule-making, and
conclude a kind of negotiating pessimism. They accept that domestic liberalization could
be used as negotiating coinage to obtain market access abroad. But they conclude that
6 The recent initiatives in the South Asian region are an exception to India's general preference for
multilateralism.
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items of interest to India, such as improved market access for its services exports through
movement of individuals, as well as for textiles and clothing will not be seriously
addressed by trading partners. On the other hand, the agenda will be dominated by the
interests of the economically powerful countries, ranging from TRIPS in the past, to labor
and environmental standards, competition and investment policy, and government
procurement in the future. Seattle dictates that these allegations be taken very seriously.
To some extent, this reluctance to engage more proactively is based on a certain justified
diffidence to which the TRIPs experience has contributed. This fear, which can be
dubbed as the thin-end-of-the-wedge syndrome, attaches a certain cost to engagement and
emanates from one particular view of the negotiating process: once developing countries
accede to the demand to discuss any of these issues, there will be an irresistible tide that
developing country will not be able to control and that will inexorably lead to an outcome
inimical to their interests. In such an environment, it is argued, bargaining is simply not
attractive to engage in.
On negotiating pessimism, we would make several observations. First of all, India's
indiscriminately negative approach to the introduction of new issues in the negotiating
agenda needs to be reconsidered. It is essential to distinguish between issues in which the
negotiating outcome will inevitably be inimical to India's interests, and those in which
even the worst case scenario does not imply unfavourable consequences. It was right to
resist insidious protectionism in the form of higher labor and environmental standards or
rent transfer mechanisms such as the TRIPs agreement. But, as we argue below, it is
difficult to justify the objection to the introduction of competition policy and disciplines
on government procurement, unless we accept that complete national sovereignty is to be
valued above improved policy at home and improved access to foreign markets.
Second, the prospects for significant gains in market access are not as bleak as they have
been hitherto. Especially, in the area of labor mobility, with labor shortages developing
in the US, the environment might be more propitious than it has ever been. Moreover,
negotiating pessimism is an empirical proposition that needs to be seriously tested. India
has never really done so because of its own unwillingness to make concessions and open
its markets. And internationally, India has aligned itself consistently with countries that
have argued for closed rather than open policies. The way to test negotiating pessimism
and even ameliorate it is for India to align itself with coalitions that form on a shared
premise of liberal policies. Coalitions need not be fixed but could vary depending on the
issue. For example, India's natural allies should be the Cairns group in agriculture, Japan
and Hong Kong on antidumping, and the EU on investment and competition policies.
Of course, there is no guarantee of success in the short term. But in the longer term, good
arguments and pro-liberalization coalitions can be successful. Moreover, if India is
identified as a strong clear voice in favor of open competitive markets, its opposition to
disguised protectionism in the form of inclusion of labor or environmental standards will
be more credible. The opposition will be seen as founded on substance rather than ritual
defensiveness. The success of developing countries in resisting the inclusion of labor
standards in Seattle attests to the influence that can be wielded by them.
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III. Issues in Selected Sectors
A. Manufacturing
India has an unambiguous interest in actively seeking negotiations to bring down tariffs
on industrial products.7 The interest is fourfold. First, India's tariffs today, even after
significant reform, remain exceptionally high and almost the highest in the world (Chart
2). Further liberalization is desirable but difficult for internal reasons and this domestic
situation could yield negotiating coinage in the next round.
Chart 2: Cross-Country Comparison of Average Tariff Rates (1998)
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Second, even if the pace of further liberalization is divorced from external bargaining
imperatives, India has a strong interest in reducing the level of its Uruguay Round bound
tariffs. The wedge between the applied and bound remains high and creates uncertainty
and lack of predictabilty about trade policy (Table 2). According to a recent survey
domestic investors appear not to have confidence in the stability of government policies
(Table 3). Bringing bound levels closer to current and future applied levels can engender
confidence in the predictability of policies. Recent tariff policy increases - the special
additional duty of 4 percentage points imposed in 1998-99 and the surcharge equivalent
to 10 percent of the basic customs duty levied in 1999-2000 - illustrate the costs of not
having tighter external discipline on trade policies. Had such discipline existed in the
form of bindings that "bit", the government would have been forced to raise revenues
through alterative, trade-neutral and hence less costly measures.
7 See Hertel and Martin (1999) for a quantification of the benefits from further global liberalization of
inanufacturing tariffs.
A, Pthough this measure was intended to rectify negative protection by imposing a tax on imnported goods
whose domestic counterparts already faced a 4 percent sales duty, the manner in which it was levied
resulted in affording some extra protection to domestically produced goods.
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Third, reductions in tariffs by partner countries will have important market access effects
for India. Further reductions, particularly in tariffs on textiles and clothing, are likely to
improve India's terms-of-trade and yield sizable welfare benefits.9
One particularly important aspect of these market access effects, and perhaps the most
compelling reason for seeking cuts in tariffs in the textiles, clothing, and leather sectors,
relates to trade diversion. In the current environment, such reductions are necessary to
arrest the trade diversion that MFN traders such as India have suffered as a result of
regional agreements. We present one example - in relation to NAFTA - which brings
home starkly this impact. It is likely that there are similar effects in the EU market
stemming from preferential arrangements between the EU on the one hand and Eastern
European and Mediterranean countries on the other.
Chart 3: Exports of India and Mexico to North American Market, 1990-1998
9 See Hertel and Martin (1999).
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Chart 3 shows the evolution in India's and Mexico's exports to the US before and after
NAFTA. Between 1990 and 1998, Mexico's manufacturing exports to the US grew by
about US$46 billion, while India registered an increase of US$ 5 billion. In clothing
where India is assured a certain absolute quantitative outcome by virtue of the MFA
quotas, India's share of total US and Canadian imports declined after NAFTA: between
1994 and 1998, India's share declined by 0.5 percentage points, from 3.9 to 3.4 percent.
Over the same period, Mexico's share rose from 4.7 percent to 11.8 percent, an increase
of over 7 percentage points, translating into US$ 18 billion of additional exports.
In the case of clothing, NAFTA opened up a preference margin for Mexico equal to the
implicit tariff on India's export quotas. Even after the abolition of the MFA, when the
implicit tariff comes down, the margin of preference will decline but will remain
substantial, between 15 and 40 percent, depending on the product line. MFN tariffs must
come down if this policy-induced advantage is to be leveled. India, therefore, has a strong
interest in seeking to reduce tariffs on all industrial products, especially textiles and
clothing.
Can these trade diversion costs be offset through alternative means, for example, by
disciplining the use of Article XXIV? This is unlikely for two reasons: first, there are too
many large preferential traders already who are likely to resist the fundamental changes
to Article XXIV that are necessary to address the trade diversion inflicted on third
countries. Second, even if these changes can be effected, they will not be applied
retroactively. The effects of all past regional agreements, including NAFTA and the EU-
Eastern European agreements, cannot be undone through rule-making; they will have to
be addressed by eliminating the trade-diverting effects of regionalism at source - the
MFN tariff.
B. Agriculturel0
Agriculture illustrates most starkly the disjunction between India's domestic policies and
its external negotiating position. High tariffs for manufacturing, combined until recently
with restrictions on exports of agricultural products, have led to an incentive structure
that taxes rather than protects agriculture. And although manufacturing tariffs have been
reduced and most export restrictions eliminated, manufacturing continues to be favored
relative to agriculture. Yet, India's multilateral position is one of defensiveness seeking
the freedom to protect rather than exploiting actual and potential comparative advantage
by seeking an open regime internationally.
India's agricultural trade policy regime is characterized by some import QRs, many of
which are likely to be eliminated as a result of WTO panel rulings on disputes between
India and trading partners over India's invocation of balance of payments grounds for
maintaining QRs.
'0 This section draws heavily on Gulati (1999)
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India's average applied tariffs in agriculture are 26 percent while bound rates in the WTO
are 94 percent, a wedge of 68 percentage points (Table 2). In about 83 percent of
agricultural tariff lines, the wedge is over 50 percent (Table 4). The major items such as
rice (applied tariff of 0 percent), skimmed milk (0 percent), wheat (0 percent), pulses (0
percent), sugar (25 percent), and edible oils (15 percent) are virtually fully integrated
with world markets (except of course for the export QRs) even though the bound rate is
extremely high."1 On domestic support, total AMS tends to be negative, suggesting
taxation rather than protection of agriculture. On export competition, Indian agricultural
exporters do not receive any direct export subsidies. However, there is some support in
the form of exemption of agricultural export profits from income tax and subsidies on
freight and for certain floriculture and horticultural exports.
At the same time, India has significant actual and potential agricultural exports in rice,
sugar, dairy products, cotton, and processed foods, and in the long run even in cereals.
These exporting possibilities will be more fully realized as the discrimination against
agriculture is fully eliminated.
This combination of a relatively unprotected domestic regime and potential comparative
advantage means that India has a real interest in seeking to eliminate protection in
international agricultural markets. India's sugar and dairy exporters have already
expressed a serious interest in reducing barriers to their exports. As in manufacturing,
India also suffers from the preferences granted to competing suppliers in sectors such as
sugar. It therefore has a real interest in reducing agricultural tariffs as well.
And yet, India's position is defensive, continuing to focus on the freedom to protect to
safeguard food security.12 India should seriously consider aligning itself with the Cairns
group of agricultural exporters consistent with an overall strategy of forming coalitions
based on a liberalizing ideology. In this regard, many of the specific proposals in Gulati
(1999), including elimination of export subsidies, elimination of tariff quotas, moving
from aggregate AMS to product-specific AMS commitments, and disciplining blue box
measures are worthy of consideration.
C. Intellectualproperty 13
The main issues in TRIPs are: using TRIPs as a device for ensuring partner country
compliance; developing domestic policies and institutions to offset some of the more
egregious impact of TRIPs14 and harness the benefits of IP protection in other areas; and
developing mechanisms for national and international protection for IP produced in
India.'
" However, state trading enterprises continue to influence trade in agricultural products.
12 As Gulati (1999) argues, food security concerns can be adequately addressed through policies other than
domestic trade protection.
3 This section draws heavily on Subramanian (1999).
14 The Uruguay Round TRIPs agreement did impose costs on India, particularly in the pharmaceutical
sector (see Subramanian (1995)), which are likely to be felt in the early part of the next century.
15 There are a number of issues that have generated well-entrenched and occasionally extreme positions
such as compulsory licensing for non-working, parallel imports, transfer of technology, and restrictive
13
TRIPs as an enforcement device
How can the commitment by industrial countries to remove all the MFA textile quotas
("walk off the cliff") come January 1 2004 be enforced? The answer seems to be that if
the industrial countries renege on their commitment in textiles, developing countries
should withdraw or threaten to withdraw their TRIPs obligations. In principle, cross-
retaliation in TRIPs could be a weapon for developing countries, but the peculiarities of
IP make it more difficult than in other areas.16 In a recent proposal (Subramanian and
Wattal (2000)), it is argued that such cross-retaliation, if designed with care, can be
feasible, effective, and probably legal.
The essence of the proposal is that India should alter its draft IP legislation to specify that
the Indian executive retains the right to revoke some of the IP rights of foreign patent
owners in the event that partner countries fail to comply with commitments that affect
India's market access. Specifying that this revocation would only be pursuant to a WTO
authorization to retaliate would preserve its WTO-legality. Several options present
themselves in terms of the form and timing of the revocation. However, one question
that needs to be considered is whether current rules that allow retaliation across sectors
only as a final resort circumscribe the ability of countries to use such retaliation
effectively. India should be able to argue that retaliation within goods for noncompliance
by partners in goods is not "practicable." Retaliation in TRIPs has the attractive property
that, if implemented, it would be welfare enhancing, and therefore credible and
practicable. The ability to use TRIPs as a retaliation device would also address broader
concerns about the asymmetry of the WTO dispute settlement process and the lack of
retaliatory power for developing countries. 17
Developing domestic policies and institutions
The two most important policy instruments available to India to mitigate some of the
effects of the high levels of patent protection are compulsory licensing and competition
policies. India needs therefore both to implement a new competition policy and develop
the capability to use compulsory licensing effectively. The flexibility afforded by
compulsory licensing comes in two forms: first, countries are virtually unrestricted in the
circumstances under which they can grant compulsory licences.'8 Second, while a
number of conditions need to be fulfilled when these licences are granted, it is possible
business practices. However, these issues are either not seriously important or misguided (see Subramanian
(1999) for a fuller discussion). They should be spared negotiating effort and time.
16 To see why, it is important to recall that IPRs are private rights conferred through domestic legislation.
While it is easy to raise tariffs in retaliation, to withdraw private rights granted through domestic legislation
would be very difficult, perhaps even unconstitutional in many legal systems. Furthermore, withdrawing
rights would be of little value unless alternative sources of production for the patented product can be
found.
17 It is notable that Ecuador has taken similar steps in retaliating against the European Union for its failure
to remedy the WTO-inconsistencies in its banana import regime.
18 The only grounds on which compulsory licences cannot be granted is non-working of the patent locally.
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for national authorities to meet them and yet dilute the monopolistic impact of the
proprietary protection granted in the first place (Wattal (2000)).
The advantages of deploying competition policy are twofold. First, there is some latitude
in determining the optimal degree of protection that balances the need to foster
innovation while ensuring technological diffusion and consumer protection. For example,
what constitutes abusive pricing is a question that will admit of a wide variety of answers.
The second advantage follows from the language of the TRIPs agreement. There is even
greater flexibility in the use of compulsory licences - in two key respects - when they are
granted to remedy anti-competitive practices,19 which could be usefully harnessed by
India.
A really crucial public policy issue that arises in relation to use of new technologies
(biotechnology, including genetic modification) is how to harness their benefits while
minimizing the attendant risks to consumer safety, biodiversity, health, and the
environment. In India as in other countries, opposition to the use of these technologies
can be vocal and sometimes extreme. But if these concerns are to be addressed, there
must be a domestic regulatory body and process that makes informed and transparent
public policy choices and commands public trust. Existing institutions need to be
strengthened along the lines of the FDA in the US.
Indian intellectual property: genetic resources, indigenous knowledge, and geographical
indications
India and other developing countries have made sensible proposals seeking greater
protection for "intellectual property" generated in these countries in the form of
indigenous knowledge and geographical indications.20 But a challenging agenda of
research and policy lies ahead. How extensive are genetic resources and indigenous
knowledge and to what uses can they be put? How important is the potential economic
value of these resources? And finally, how should a proprietary right be created that is
enforceable internationally, and that rewards agents, including traditional communities, to
preserve and create such resources and knowledge? Similar questions arise in relation to
geographical indications. How can names in the public domaip be restored to proprietary
protection? In these areas, a credible international negotiating position can be built if
such systems of protection are instituted within India and shown to be workable.
In relation to the new technologies, India's involuntary response seems to be to favor low
levels of protection - for plant varieties and biotechnological inventions. But this is not a
position that is based on underlying research. A case could be made that stronger
proprietary protection in these areas could generate some dynamic benefits for India
19 When compulsory licences are used to remedy anti-competitive practices, the TRIPs agreement provides
that (i) no case needs to be made that the patentee was unwilling to license the patent on reasonable
commercial terms as a precondition for granting the compulsory licence; and (ii) the principle that
remuneration for the compulsory licence should be "adequate" need not be respected.
20 On geographical indications, it might be sensible for India to seek to form an alliance with the European
Union which is a major demandeur in this area.
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either in the form of research by Indians, in India, or on products and technologies of
value to India. Some research on agriculture in India (Pray and Basant (1999) and Pray
and Ramaswarni (1999)) suggests that these dynamic benefits could be significant. More
research to underpin informed policy positions is warranted.
D. Anti-dumping
The use of anti-dumping has spread significantly from the five original industrial country
users (Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand and the US) to developing countries,
including India. Since mid-1997, India has initiated 21 antidumping cases. It ranks as
one of the largest users of antidumping actions (see Table 5), and the ambitions in this
area are escalating, reflected in the recent upgradation of the antidumping cell into a full-
fledged directorate.
At the same time, India is also a major victim of antidumping actions, in fact the worst hit
if measured in terms of antidumping actions per dollar of exports (Table 6). While the
loss associated with the latter resonates easily with policy makers and the public, it is the
domestic use of antidumping that arguably represents the major threat.
The only justifiable use of antidumping - to correct predatory price behavior by
foreigners - requires exporters to have market power. This is implausible in the Indian
context because in a number of antidumping actions there were imports from 20 or more
countries. In those cases where suppliers were few, discipline was present in the form of
rival domestic firms (see World Bank (forthcoming)).
Given the fact that the cost of protection increases at an increasing rate, antidumping by
India is worse in its impact than elsewhere because it is levied on top of tariffs that are
high and certainly higher than other antidumping users. Antidumping could turn out to be
the nocturnal Penelope: undoing the liberalization unleashed by the tariff reductions.
Further, the experience from other countries has been that antidumping actions are
typically taken against the most efficient suppliers. This in turn signals other exporters to
raise prices, inflicting terms of trade losses.
The serious costs of antidumping to India - both as victim and perpetrator -mean that it
should push strongly for reforming antidumping provisions. The most intellectually
coherent approach would be to fold antidumping into competition law provisions on
predation which would provide the appropriate safeguards against protectionist use of
AD. Alternatively, AD laws should be required to incorporate buyer/consumer interests
and provide meaningful representation for such interests in AD proceedings. India's
proposals have focussed on specific provisions and amounted to tinkering at the margin
rather than in eradicating the menace altogether.
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E. Services 21
In services, the most important initiatives need to be taken at the domestic level.
Nevertheless, there remains scope for constructive use of the multilateral trading system
both in realizing credible domestic liberalization and securing market access abroad.
Before we elaborate on these themes it is instructive to recall what we have learnt about
services trade liberalization.
(i) There are substantial gains both from liberalization within countries, especially in key
infrastructure services like telecommunications, transport and financial services, and
from the elimination of barriers to their exports.
(ii) Successful liberalization requires
* Emphasis on competition more than a change of ownership
* Credibility of policy and liberalization programs
* Domestic regulations to remedy market failure and pursue legitimate social goals
with economic efficiency
(iii) Effective market access requires
- Elimination of explicit restrictions
* Disciplines on implicit regulatory barriers
In India, the untrammelled freedom to chose policy in services has led to unwise policy
choices. Not only have the pace and extent of liberalization been modest, its pattern has
also been poorly conceived. In each of the three key infrastructure sectors, there has been
a reluctance to introduce meaningful competition through unimpeded entry; limited
liberalization to foreign participation has been grudgingly allowed with limitations on
both equity and numbers, perpetuating imperfectly competitive structures; there have
been significant policy reversals, for example in power and telecommunications with loss
to policy credibility; and while due recognition has been accorded to domestic regulation,
it has been late in coming and imperfect in operation. Moreover, the multilateral route
has not been used to any significant extent to liberalize or to precommit to future
liberalization.
Table 7 summarizes how the policy choices made by India in three key service sectors
have impeded effective competition. In all these sectors, limited freedom of
establishment coupled with restrictions on competition through alternative modes, has led
to imperfectly competitive markets which has raised costs and facilitated rent
appropriation by foreign firms.
Table 8 and Chart 4 depict some of the effects of these policy choices in
telecommunications and transport, respectively.22 Table 8 compares the price of
21 Throughout this paper, services trade will refer not only cross-border delivery, as in the case of goods,
but also supply through the establishment of firms and movement of individuals.
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international calls in several countries, with the call from the United States to the country
in question serving as the benchmark (since the United States is one of the most
competitive markets). In the case of India, the benchmark is itself inflated because
providers based in the United States are obliged to pay the Indian monopolist the
settlement rate for terminating their calls, and this inflates their price. Nevertheless, we
find that the price of calling from India is nearly twice this overstated internationally
competitive price. This is significantly higher in absolute and relative terms than the
price from locations such as Hong Kong and Australia where competition has been
introduced, and from Singapore where call-back services have been permitted to eat away
at monopolistic price margins.
Chart 4 compares the transport and insurance costs for Indian exports to the US with
those for Singapore and other countries. The United States is one of the few countries
which collects statistics on its imports on both a fob and cif basis. The difference
provides a rough measure of ad valorem transport and insurance costs. Estimates of ad
valorem nominal tariffs are also presented. Insofar as India exports lower value products
than Singapore the ad valorem transport cost estimates for India are likely to be biased
upward. Nevertheless, it is particularly striking that even though India faces lower
applied tariffs than Singapore in sectors of major export interest like apparel articles and
accessories, iron and steel articles, and electric machinery, its higher transport and
insurance costs more than offset this advantage so that the total incidence of transport
costs and tariffs is greater. The picture looks more worrying when India is compared
with all other countries (which is a less efficient benchmark than Singapore). Transport
and insurance costs are nearly twice as high than for all countries.
Securing market access: Natural persons
There is no doubt that the Uruguay Round outcome in services was unbalanced. The
much-touted trade-off between modes of delivery simply did not take place. Although
antipathy to commitments on labor mobility in partner countries was a major contributing
factor, an unwillingness on the part of India to open up domestic services markets made
its demands for labor mobility difficult to sustain. With India opening up its markets,
that bargaining dynamic can change and the prospects for serious inter-modal trade-offs -
obtaining labor movement in return for allowing greater commercial presence for foreign
service providers - must be greater now. Also, the fact of severe shortages of skilled
labor in the US and the powerful constituency of high-technology companies lobbying
for relaxation of visa limits makes this a propitious time to put labor mobility squarely on
the negotiating agenda.2 3 That India has a strong comparative advantage in some of the
high-skilled
22 See Chadha (1999) for a general equilibrium analysis of the benefits to India of liberalizing services
trade.
23 The notions of the US as the unrivaled centre of technology and the role of technological progress in
motoring the recent US economic expansion resonate deeply with the US public. They would therefore be
loath to countenance any obstacles to this march of progress even if it involves greater imports of labor-
related services.
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Chart 4:Total Incidence of Transport Costs, Insurance Costs and Tariffs on Exports
to the US: India and Other Countries
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labor-intensive sectors is beyond doubt and Table 9 emphasizes this point in the case of
software services.
India's defensive position on services liberalization impedes the possibility of credibly
advancing India's labor-related services through inter-modal trade-offs. More
specifically, the resistance to the use of horizontal formulae in negotiations and the
insistence on a request and offer approach may be ill-advised. Mattoo and Olarreaga
(2000) have elaborated a specific proposal, based on the use of formulae, which can serve
to extract meaningful commitments on the movement of individual service suppliers from
trading partners.
In essence, this proposal would require a country to provide increased "foreign labour
content entitlements" to their domestic firms in relation to the country's increased exports
of services.24 The proposal offers several advantages. First, it is internationally
symmetric. All countries would be obliged to create such entitlements, though how much
they are used would be determined by sound economic considerations of modal
comparative advantage. The entitlements would not be bilateral, but international. Second
it is based on a balance of concessions, an appealing principle in trade negotiations.
Exporters of labor services would receive benefits commensurate with efforts to open up
their domestic services markets. Finally, the scheme is also attractive because it generates
a desirable liberalizing momentum. Conventional mercantilist negotiations on trade
barriers create a holdback problem: I would rather give less to get more from you. But
since the proposed scheme implies that my export possibilities are based on your actual
exports, it induces me to be more open.
F. Electronic commerce
WTO Members have decided that electronic delivery of products will continue to be free
from customs duties. For the moment this commitment is temporary and political, but
there are proposals to make it durable and legally binding. Two aspects of the
commitment are notable. First, only electronic transmissions are covered; goods ordered
through electronic means but imported through normal channels are explicitly excluded.
Secondly, the standstill/prohibition applies only to customs duties; there is no mention of
other forms of restrictions.
Fortunately most electronic commerce is already free of barriers (except of course those
created by differences in standards), and so the objective is really to bind this existing
openness to preclude the introduction of new barriers. But is duty-free electronic
commerce the appropriate route?
India was initially opposed to the decision on duty free treatment for electronic
25commerce, concerned that it would hurt tariff revenue. But more recently, there has
24 In a way Bill Gates' recent testimony before congress arguing for the need to allow more software
engineers to enter to maintain international competitiveness is not far-removed from the suggested scheme.
25 In principle, all types of products can be advertised and purchased over electronic networks, the potential
for electronic delivery, and the scope of the WTO decision not to impose duties is more limited. It requires
that a final product be presented as digitalized information and transmitted electronically, typically over the
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been a change in position. Perhaps thanks to the growing importance of software exports,
India has now joined the many countries that are in support of the existing political
decision on duty-free treatment for electronic commerce to be made legally binding. We
would argue that the initial inhibitions and the current enthusiasm are both misplaced and
do not further India's real commercial interests.
The initial inhibitions were founded on fears of revenue loss. Mattoo and Schuknecht
(1999) estimated the tariff revenue countries collected from these products.2 6 Even if all
delivery of digitizable media products moved online - an unlikely prospect - the revenue
loss would be minimal. India would lose 0.4 per cent of tariff revenue and 0.1 per cent of
total revenue.
Equally, the current enthusiasm is also misplaced as the value of liberating ecommerce
from duties is either superfluous or virtually devoid of value. Since the bulk of such
commerce concerns services, the relevant regime is that established by the GATS regime
on cross-border trade. This Agreement allows countries to decide whether to commit to
market access, i.e. not to impose quotas, and to national treatment, i.e. not to discriminate
in any way against foreign services and suppliers. If a country has already made such a
commitment, then any further promise not to impose duties is superfluous because
customs duties inherently discriminate against foreign services. If a country has not
made such a commitment, then the promise not to impose customs duties is worth little,
because a country remains free to impede access through discriminatory internal taxation
- which has been carefully excluded from the scope of the decision. Worse the
prohibition of such duties, may induce recourse to quotas which are ironically still
permissible in spite of being economically inferior instruments.
Hence, the focus on duty-free treatment is misplaced. The objective for countries like
India should rather be to push trading partners into making deeper and wider
commitments under the GATS on cross-border trade regarding market access (which
would preclude quantitative restrictions) and national treatment (which would preclude
all forms of discriminatory taxation).
Table 10 summarizes the current state of commitments on cross-border supply in some of
the areas in which developing countries have an export interest. In software
implementation and data processing, of the total WTO Membership of over 130, only 56
and 54 Members, respectively, have made commitments; and only around half of these
Internet. The bulk of the products that can be supplied in this manner are services, financial, legal,
customized software, etc. Some information and entertainment products typically characterized as goods,
such as books, standardized software, music and videos embody digitalized information that can also be
supplied electronically over the Internet.
26 Services are not subject to customs duties as far as we know. So we need concern ourselves only with
the fiscal implications if international trade in digitizable products currently classified as goods shifts to the
Internet, and if no tariffs are levied on such products. The estimates are reasonably reliable for the most
important categories where trade and tariff data were available for the most important countries. A few
data problems persist as volume data for some products facing specific tariffs were not available,
sometimes the tariff rate was not provided, and applied tariff rates for some of the smaller countries were
not available.
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commitments guarantee unrestricted market access, and a similar proportion guarantee
unqualified national treatment. In all professional services, there are commitments from
74 Members, but less than a fifth assure unrestricted market access and national
treatment, respectively. There clearly remains considerable scope for widening and
deepening commitments.
G. Government procurement
There are many good reasons to liberalise government procurement. Some benefits are
analogous to those arising from the liberalisation of trade, but to these must be added the
budgetary benefits of efficient procurement and significant reductions in rent-seeking
which is rampant in procurement. Thus, both the consumer and the taxpayer will benefit.
But WTO experience shows that most countries (developed and developing) are reluctant
to immediately accept full liberalisation of procurement.
For India, Srivastava (1999) estimates that the total value of purchases by the central and
state governments and public enterprises, which could in principle be subject to
international government procurement rules, varies between 3.4 and 5.7 percent of GDP.
For certain procurement contracts, a price preference of 15 per cent is given to
indigenous equipment suppliers, requiring that at least 20 per cent value must be added in
India. In the shipping sector, price preferences up to 30 per cent apply to Indian bidders
on procurement contracts. If more efficient procurement practices can be implemented
domestically, Srivastava (1999) calculates that the total savings could be as much as 1.7
percent of GDP or about US$ 8 billion. Even if only a fraction of the estimated savings is
realized, the gain can be substantial.
It is clear once again that India has exercised the freedom to choose in ways that are
probably very costly for consumers and taxpayers. Even if it had chosen wisely, it is
reasonable to ask whether a multilateral agreement can add to national legislation which
often contains similar provisions to mitigate agency problems? One of the biggest
problems in procurement is that of moral hazard on the part of the procurer. For instance,
a recent survey conducted by the Confederation of Indian Industries shows that
procurement contracts frequently involve corruption. The significant benefit of a
multilateral agreement is in helping to overcome national agency problems in
procurement by creating mechanisms for reciprocal international monitoring supported by
multilateral enforcement. It achieves this by shifting the legal scope for monitoring from
dispersed taxpayers, who may have little interest in monitoring individual procurement
decisions, to the bidders for contracts who have a significant stake.
Two elements of a possible multilateral agreement are crucial in this context. First, the
agency problem is mitigated by creating obligations on the procurer to be transparent.
Secondly, foreign suppliers are given the opportunity to challenge the decisions of the
procurer before national courts or independent and impartial review bodies. As a starting
point, it would seem both desirable and feasible for India to be open to commitments on
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increased transparency and strengthened enforcement.2 7 This is in fact the raison d'8tre
of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement.
In addition to improved domestic policy, government procurement offers the potential for
making negotiating linkages. Foreign suppliers can only effectively contest the market
for government procurement if they are not unduly handicapped by restrictive trade
measures. Hence, the creation of genuine international competition for procurement
contracts depends crucially on the liberalisation of trade. It would, therefore, be natural
for developing countries to make their willingness to accept disciplines on government
procurement depend on future negotiations on market access for goods and under the
GATS on measures affecting trade in services.
For instance, one of the most important services sectors in the context of government
procurement is construction. Yet in the GATS, Members have usually not bound
themselves to grant market access to the supply of construction services through the
presence of natural persons, except for certain limited categories of intra-corporate
transferees. The assurance that workers can be temporarily moved to construction sites
would greatly increase the benefit of non-discriminatory government procurement for
developing countries. The same applies to procurement of other services such as
software and transport.
H Standards and related domestic regulations
Effective market access for both goods and services requires the elimination not only of
explicit restrictions, but also of the implicit barriers created by standards and other
domestic regulations. In goods, environmental standards (for shrimp) and safety
standards (for certain types of apparel) have both impacted on Indian exports. In
services, trade-restrictive effects have arisen from a variety of qualification and licensing
requirements in professional and numerous other services.28
There are in principle three international routes to dealing with such barriers:
harmonization of national regulations (leading possibly to the creation of international
standards); mutual recognition, and strengthening multilateral disciplines on national
standards. These need to be complemented by upgradataion of domestic standards.
Harmonization
In both goods and services, where countries have varying preferences for quality,
including in relation to safety and the environment, harmonization is probably not
desirable (see Bhagwati and Hudec (1996)). In the case of services, the difficulty of
27 It has also been suggested that countries could continue to maintain preference margins, but agree to bind
them and make them subject to unilateral or negotiated reductions - in a manner analogous to tariffs.
28 The requirement of registration with, or membership of, professional organisations can also constitute an
obstacle for a person wishing to provide the service on a temporary basis. For instance, in the United States
requirements to practice medicine for foreign-qualified doctors vary from state to state. Candidates must
also pass the qualifying examination of the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, and
then undergo a period of graduate medical education at a hospital in the United States.
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harmonization is revealed by the absence of widely accepted international standards.
Where such standards exist, as in banking or maritime transport, meeting them is seen as
a first step towards acceptability, rather than as a sufficient condition for market access.
MRAs
India's concern about MRAs is justified, because they are like sector-specific preferential
arrangements. If regulatory barriers are prohibitively high, i.e. if you start from autarky,
then recognition can only be trade creating. But if they are not, then selective recognition
can have discriminatory effects and lead to trade-diversion away from those who are left
out of MRAs. However, India's attempt to address the problem by requiring that
developing countries be allowed to join MRAs is not tenable and ignores a basic fact:
MRAs are voluntary, they cannot be made to happen. A multilateral agreement cannot
oblige countries to conclude MRAs - just as any provision such as Article V of GATS or
Article XXIV of GATT cannot make regional integration happen.
So what is to be done? Multilateral disciplines must be used to ensure that MRAs are not
used as a means of discrimination and exclusion. These disciplines operate at two levels:
the general rules on preferential arrangements (Article XXIV of the GATT for goods and
Article V of the GATS) and the specific rules for MRAs (in the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade for goods and Article VII of the GATS). Both sets of rules need to be
strengthened and enforced. It would seem that Article XXIV, which disallows
discrimination between countries in regard to domestic measures (including standards
and regulation), would not allow MRAs to be justified as elements of integration
agreements. However, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which encourages
the conclusion of MRAs, should not be interpreted as permitting discrimination through
MRAs. A clarification of this point is essential.
In services, Article V on integration agreements does not explicitly preclude MRAs, and
several countries have chosen to notify their MRAs under this provision. However,
Article VII of the GATS dealing specifically with recognition, strikes a delicate balance
by allowing such agreements, provided they are not used as a means of discrimination
and third countries have the opportunity to accede or demonstrate equivalence. It should
be clarified that this provision, with its desirable non-discriminatory and open-ended
nature, overrides Article V of the GATS as far as MRAs are concerned.
Multilateral disciplines based on "necessity" test
In our view, the most important strategy for addressing barriers is to strengthen
multilateral disciplines on standards per se. The trade-inhibiting effect of the entire class
of domestic regulations can be disciplined by complementing the national treatment
obligation with a generalization of the so-called "necessity" test. This test essentially
leaves governments free to deal with economic and social problems provided that any
measures taken are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the relevant
objective.
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This test is already part of the Uruguay Round Agreement for goods and the recently
established disciplines in the accountancy sector. It would seem desirable to use the test
to create a presumption in favor of economically efficient choice of policy in remedying
market failure and in pursuing non-economic objectives.29 For instance, in the case of
professionals like doctors, a requirement to requalify would be judged unnecessary, since
the basic problem, inadequate information about whether they possess the required skills,
could be remedied by a less burdensome test of competence.
This test could also be applied to situations where a country is contemplating trade-
restrictive measures on the grounds that environmental or labour standards in a partner
country are too "low." The necessity test would not seek to deny a country's right to be
concerned about environmental and labour problems in other countries, but subject the
instruments it chooses to critical scrutiny. The question would be posed as to whether
trade restrictions were the best instrument to address the relevant problem, and whether
alternatives to the trade restriction, say compensation or international negotiation, would
be more efficient in attaining the country's objectives.
Upgradation of domestic standards
Finally, India must upgrade its standards and related institutions consistent with domestic
preferences for quality. This would strengthen the case for obtaining foreign recognition
and also allow foreign technical barriers to be credibly challenged. For instance, the poor
standards of a few professional colleges in the country and their willingness to award
certificates without adequate examinations, penalizes all members of the profession
seeking to work abroad by legitimizing the imposition of elaborate requalification
requirements.
I. Competition policy
India has relied for decades on the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, and
there is now a strong need for a modern competition policy.3 0 One reason, discussed
above in the context of the TRIPs agreement, is that competition policy, coupled with
compulsory licensing, offers one avenue for mitigating some of its most egregious
effects. More fundamental domestic reasons, such as the concentration of production in
several sectors sometimes associated with the entry of foreign investors, also dictate the
adoption of a new competition policy. But does this mean that India should embrace
efforts to have multilateral disciplines on competition policies?
A negative response could be based on the fear that multilateral disciplines will constrain
the design or implementation of India's own competition policy or on the view that
multilateralism can add little to national efforts. On the first point, it should be noted that
any future rules are likely to be very general and probably not very ambitious.
Competition policy standards, practices, and institutions are divergent enough between
29 This argument is developed in Mattoo and Subramanian (1998).
30 See Bhattacharjea, "Trade and Competition Policy in a Developing Country Context," (1999).
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industrial countries as to militate against very detailed and specific multilateral rule-
making.
On the second point, there are a number of cases where multilateral engagement on
competition policy can bring about outcomes that could benefit India. Reform of anti-
dumping to bring it within the fold of competition policy is one case in point, but
unfortunately the prospects of this happening in the near future are dim given the
opposition of the United States and the European Union. The most coherent multilateral
case for a competition policy rests on the possibility of negative spillovers across markets
that need cooperation to ensure an outcome that maximizes global welfare. Several
examples of potential interest to India can be found. In the shipping market, international
cartelization inflicts terms of trade losses on India. Excessively high levels of IP
protection can inhibit transfer of technology. Foreign export cartels may charge
excessively high prices. In all these cases, although domestic competition policy could
attempt to redress the anti-competitive impact, it may be relatively ineffective because of
jurisdictional problems or because remedial measures (for example, refusing foreign IPR
owners or foreign suppliers of essential products access to domestic markets) may not be
credible. Enforcement can be more effective when taken at source, involving the
cooperation of partner countries.
On balance, it would seem that the most substantial gains for India would arise from the
creation of an effective domestic competition policy. Multilateral rules on competition
policy are likely to provide net benefits, albeit small in magnitude, especially if the
prospects of addressing the menace of anti-dumping are slim. It is, therefore, difficult to
understand the strong opposition that India tends to express on this issue.
J Investment
The strongest analytical case for multilateral rules on FDI stems from the proliferation of
investment incentives which creates policy-induced distortions in FDI flows without
augmenting their aggregate size. In view of the superior ability of richer countries to
grant such incentives, multilateral rule-making on investment could be unambiguously
beneficial for developing countries such as India. Given the widespread use of these
incentives by industrial countries (not just at federal but also at sub-federal levels), the
prospects for disciplining them are likely to be slim.
Thus, if multilateral discipline on investment incentives are ruled out, can a case still be
made for multilateral agreement on investment? It would be generally acknowledged that
clear benefits derive from a liberal domestic regime for foreign domestic investment. In
the case of India, despite considerable liberalization, FDI continues to be regulated and in
an ad hoc manner, imposing serious costs31. The issue is whether multilateral rules on
investment are necessary and desirable or whether FDI regimes should be determined
unilaterally. Even strong advocates for multilateral disciplines on tariffs, tend to be less
enthusiastic about such disciplines on FDI.
31 See Das (1999).
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It is puzzling as to why the case for multilateral rules on FDI is different from that for
conventional trade policy or for trade in services, which after all involves opening
domestic markets to FDI. Theoretically, should countries have greater flexibility in
designing an FDI regime for cars and electronics than for banks and telecommunications?
If anything, the need for regulation which is so intrinsic to services, and which qualifies
to some extent the nature and pace of opening up to FDI, is less strong in the case of FDI
in goods.
The arguments in favor of multilateral engagement made above - facilitating domestic
reform and providing a means of precommitment to good domestic policies - seem to be
no less relevant to FDI in goods than to conventional trade policy. Moreover, under a
new competition policy, India can, like all other countries, prevent the acquisition and
abuse of market power by, and regulate other anti-competitive practices of, foreign (and
domestic) firms. The interesting question then is whether there is need for additional
discretion to regulate FDI and whether this will be unduly circumscribed by multilateral
rules. One example would seem to be measures designed to ensure the transfer of
technology and training of local workers.32 There is undoubtedly need for more research
on whether other safeguards need to be built into an investment agreement to preserve the
freedom to pursue national objectives. But again blanket opposition to any investment
agreement is not easy to comprehend.
IV. Concrete Proposals
We now present a set of concrete proposals that India could consider in the ongoing trade
negotiations. These are summarized in Table 11.
Industrial tariffs: It is in India's interest to reduce its bound and actual tariffs and to seek
to reduce tariffs in industrial countries, especially in textiles, clothing and footwear. The
latter is particularly urgent in view of the large trade diversion costs imposed on India
consequent upon preferential arrangements such as NAFTA. Reforms to Article XXIV,
even if feasible, will not compensate for the trade diversion from existing preferential
agreements.
Agricultural reform: Given India's actual and potential comparative advantage in
agriculture, and the policy regime, which for the most part taxes rather than protects the
sector, there is good reason for a change in India's negotiating position. Defensiveness
should cede decisively to active advocacy of global free trade in agriculture. India should
consider joining the Cairns group in supporting full liberalization of international
agricultural markets.
Services: Although the most serious challenges are domestic - enhancing domestic
competition and improving the regulatory framework - India should be open to
multilateral disciplines on services liberalization. This openness could serve as the basis
32 It is relevant that India has reserved the right to impose these requirements on foreign investment under
the GATS, on which any investment agreement is likely to be modelled.
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for creating credible negotiating linkages through a formula approach, trading domestic
liberalization for increased mobility of individual service providers. At the same time,
India should press for strengthened multilateral disciplines under the GATS on domestic
regulations, to address implicit barriers posed by qualification and licensing
requirements.
Electronic commerce: While supporting the current limited initiatives to liberalize
ecommerce, India should push actively for commitments under the GATS on cross-
border services trade to secure market access (by prohibiting quantitative restrictions) and
preclude all forms of discrimination (by guaranteeing national treatment). Again, India
should support strengthened disciplines on regulatory barriers to services trade.
TRIPs: India should change its draft IP legislation to ensure that TRIPs benefits can be
withdrawn in the event of noncompliance by partners with commitments that affect
India's exports. Simultaneously, it should seek to clarify WTO dispute settlement
procedures to prevent the within-sector retaliation rule from becoming an obstacle to such
action. Domestically, it should institute workable systems for protecting intellectual
property in order credibly to seek their replication internationally. A new competition
policy, combined with judicious use of compulsory licensing, can help to mitigate the
most egregious impacts of the TRIPs agreement.
Preferential agreements: The real problem with Article XXIV of the GATT and Article
V of GATS is the lack of compensation for third parties adversely affected by trade
diversion. Such compensation should be incorporated into the rules. Further, there
should be a clear reaffirmation that mutual recognition agreements cannot be used as a
means of discrimination.
Competition policy: Domestically, India should enact a new competition policy and be
willing to discuss multilateral disciplines on competition policy. These disciplines
should include outlawing practices that involve negative international spillovers such as
export cartels (as in shipping), and bringing anti-dumping within the ambit of
competition policy.
Standards: India should ensure that mutual recognition agreements are not used as a
means of discrimination. To this end, the Agreement on TBT would need to be clarified,
as would the relationship between Articles V and VII of the GATS to establish primacy
of the latter. At the same time, it should push for multilateral disciplines on domestic
regulations in goods and services based on the necessity test On labor standards, India
should be proactive in the ILO to ensure universal adherence to the basic ILO
conventions while resisting attempts to bring the issue into the WTO.
Government procurement: Given the potential gains from more efficient and transparent
government procurement, India should be willing to undertake multilateral disciplines on
government procurement. At the same time, it should seek to create natural linkages with
the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and services, so that it can meaningfully
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contest foreign procurement contracts in areas of its comparative advantage, such as labor
services.
Investment: Liberalization of India's FDI regulations will yield substantial benefits. If a
new domestic competition policy can regulate anti-competitive behavior of foreign (and
domestic) firms, a case against multilateral rules on FDI must hinge on the need for
additional discretion to regulate FDI consistent with desirable domestic objectives. This
case needs to be clearly elaborated.
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V. Conclusion
Trade can be an engine for growth. In the past, this engine has sputtered, owing to
policies rather than geography. The challenges ahead for India now lie in implementing
sound domestic policies that increase competition in, and improve the contestability of,
domestic markets. These challenges are, above all, domestic. However, active
multilateral engagement can be incrementally helpful in facilitating domestic reform and
gaining access for India's exports of goods and labor services.
In the short run, the value of such engagement might be limited if prospects for securing
increased market access are dim, and the failed Seattle negotiations heighten such
negotiating pessimism. However, this pessimism needs to be credibly tested, by a
willingness on India's part to open its markets in return for improved access. Success in
this regard is not assured, but its chances can be improved if India were to align itself
with countries that coalesce on a shared premise of sound open policies. Liberalization-
based coalition/coalitions (which can differ across issues) can be an effective force for
reform internationally with beneficial internal consequences. The success in Seattle of
developing countries such as India in resisting demands for the inclusion of backdoor
protectionism is testimony to this possibility. In the long run, the power of good
arguments, buttressed by India's growing economic weight, should not be
underestimated.
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Table 1: Summary Indicators of WTO Disputes
-All Complaint
Complainant Defendant
Developed Developing Total
Developed 63 42 105
Developing 21 11 32
Total 84 53 137
Comleted Pnch 11,
Complainllant Defendt
Developed Developing Total
Developed 9 (7) 7 (7) 16 (14)
Developing 8 (8) 2 (0) 10 (8)
Total 17 (2) 9 (2) 26 (22)
Source: World Trade Organization
11 Figures in brackets refer to number of cases in which complainants were successful.
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Table 2 Bound Tariff Rates and Effective Rates of Duty
t~~~~~~~~~~~~939~ dut? yer 00
Average unweighed tariff (per cent)
Agriculture (ISIC 1) 43 26 (16) 94 (33)
Mining (ISIC 2) 70 25 (13) 36 (9)
Manufacturing (ISIC 3, includes food processing) 73 36 (10) 52 (41)
Whole economy 71 35 (15) 54 (42)
Average unweighed tariff by stage of processing (per cent)
Unprocessed 50 25 (16) 74 (40)
Semi-processed 75 35 (9) 44 (23)
Processed 73 37 (17) 56 (51)
33 Following reform package contained in the 1993-94 Budget. The auxiliary duty was merged with
the basic customs duty in the 1993-94 Budget.
34 Effective m.f.n. rate, i.e., actual rates applied where basic rates have been reduced by exempt rates.
However, many exempt rates can not be incorporated such as where the exempt rate applies to only
a part of the HS six-digit tariff line. The effective rate also excludes specific exemptions.
35 Includes only items bound during the Uruguay Round. The bound rates do not include the
commitments under the Information Technology Agreement.
Note: Standard deviation is provided in parentheses. Tariff averages consider only those tariff lines with
ad valorem rates. Year beginning I April.
Source: UNCTAD, the World Bank, Government of India, and selected GATT Secretariat estimates.
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Table 3: Predictability, Responses and Availability of Rules and Regulations
(Percentage of respondent ratings under different categories)
agree agree disagree disagree 1999
Score 6 5 4 3 2 1
Predictability of 2 7 46 29 12 4 3.46
government rules and
regulations
Predictability of policy 2 3 45 33 9 8 3.32
changes in the annual
central budget
Advance information 0 18 11 35 25 11 3.00
to fimns about the
changes affecting them
Source: World Bank - CII survey of 210 private sector firms, 1999
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Table 4: Indicators of Indian Agricultural Trade
4.A: Difference in UR final bound rates and MIFN tariff rates:
Number of Lines by different range groups
UR-TR >= 75 401
50 =<UR-TR <75 155
25 =< UR-TR < 50 29
IO =< UR-TR <25 39
O =< UR-TR <10 4 1
UJR-TR <0 8
TOTAL 673
TR =MFN Tariff Rate (BCD) as announced in G.O.I., Budget 1999/2000.
UR =Uruguay Round final bound rates.
Notes: 1) Tariff Lines at 6-digit HS or sub-groups of 6-digit HS.
2) Includes only agricultural products.
4.1B: Aggregate Measure of Support to Indian Agriculture (selected crops)
Produc~t Spcifiq NonwPrducdt SIP: fiw TotalAMS,
1986 -34.29 2.25 -32.04
1987 ~~-32.08 3.26 -28.88
1991 -6.336-58.63
1992 -69.31 3.46 -65.85
1---f9-93 -54.75 3.14 -51.61
1994 -43.27 3.4 -39.87
1995 ~~-44.09 3.9 -40. .19
1996 -45.8 3.62 -42.22
1997 -32.16 4.12 -80
1998 ~~-41.89 3.49 -38.4
Source: Gulati (1999)
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Table 5: Antidumping Initiations by Economy Taking Action
Index of ~nfidamiping
Number of aniuni4g initiations intain "5~99
1991-94 1995-98 per dolar of mpofts,
Developed Economies
Australia 213 77 1096
Canada 84 39 199
EU 135 122 210
US 226 94 100
All developed economies 678 353 74
Developing Economies
Argentina 59 72 2627
Brazil 59 54 871
India 15 78 187
Korea 14 34 204
Mexico 127 31 275
South Africa 16 72 b/ 2324
All developing economies 394 509 313
Notes:
a-/ Based on numbers of antidumping initiations 1995-98 and values of merchandise imports for 1996.
bl 1995-97 figure.
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
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Table 6: Antidumping Initiations by Exporting Economy
Developed economies
France 26 8 34
Germany 35 30 70
Italy 16 16 77
Japan 32 23 67
UK 20 16 7
us 70 48 0
Developing economies
Brazil 50 23 58
China 115 9475
India 24 21 779
Korea 50 40
Taiwan 31 30
Thailand 26 21
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
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Table 7: Impediments to competition in the provision of infrastructure services
S-ctor Inipd _ments on Iopeil_ on eross-
-establishment - border delvery
Basic telecommunmcations Restrictions on number of Restrictions on call-back
firms (two for each services; high accounting
geographically-defined rates and no-bypass of
circle); foreign equity monopolist allowed
participation up to 49%
allowed
Financial services" Restrictions on number of Non-convertibility of rupee
new banks and branches of limits scope for cross-
foreign banks (15 per year); border delivery
foreign subsidiaries not
allowed
Maritime transport No restrictions in bulk but Bulk: use of foreign ships
number of shipping lines only if Indian ships not
fixed (3): new entry only available on "comparable"
on routes where existing rates;
lines do not operate; Liner: progressively
foreign ownership up to 74 increasing quotas on
per cent allowed specified routes.
automatically _
36 In basic telecommunications, competition has been allowed to a limited extent in recent years in the
local, intra-circle national long distance, and mobile segments but international telephony is still
monopolized. Furthermore, the approach has meant limited planned competition duopolies in fixed
telephony and in cellular mobile. At the same time, one key form of cross-border delivery, call back
services are not permitted by law, and probably not much used in practice because of the difficulty of
making payments in foreign currency.
37 Even though the scope for competition in the banking sector has been enhanced by allowing new private
sector banks since 1993 and local area banking by the private sector since 1996, the RBI fixes the number
of licenses for new banks and expansion by existing foreign banks on an annual basis. This number has
been fixed at 15 per annum in recent years. The monopoly in insurance may only now be broken. The
scope for cross-border delivery of financial services is limited by the non-convertibility of the rupee on
capital account.
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Table 8: Comparison of International Long Distance Tariffs (Telecom), 1999
ICountry From7 US To US Ac. at Liealztio 'inn'l CalBk One i
Australia $0.25 $0.14 $0.42 Competition Yes na
Hong Kong $0.31 $0.24 $0.80 Competition na na
India $0.66 $1.27 $1.28 Monopoly No 49
Singapore $0.35 $0.51 $0.85 Monopoly Yes 49
Peru $0.55 $0.71 $1.13 Monopoly ends in 99 No 100
Note:
1 .Tariffs are per minute charges in the residential international long distance market and are subject to
change. "From US" tariffs refer to the unweighted average of international calling plan rates offered by
Sprint, MCIWorldCom, and AT&T (monthly fees are not considered). "To US" tariffs represent the rate
charged by the foreign monopolist or, in case of competition, refer to the average tariff charged by a
random sample of foreign operators. In case of peak/off-peak tariff discrimination, the time-weighted
average tariff was used. Foreign operators' tariffs were converted into US dollars using market exchange
rates as published by the Financial Times.
2. Accounting rates are from the US Federal Communications Commission.
3. Information on the remaining variables comes from the ITU.
Source: Research in progress by Fink and Mattoo, World Bank, 1999
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Table 9: Cross-Country Comparisons of Costs of Software Services
Cost per fine of code (UJS$) Average salary of programmer (tU$$Country
Development Support Development Support
United States 18 1.1 46,550 43,395
ICanada 10 0.6 35,156 33,846
Australia NA NA 34,940 30,644
Japan 2 1 1.2 NA NA
Austria NA NA 33,000 33,000
Denmark 1 9 1.1 NA NA
England 1 1 0.7 38,785 38,179
France 1 3 0.8 36,750 41,250
Germany 22 1.3 42,058 34,848
Greece 6 0.4 NA NA
Ireland 1 0 0.6 NA NA
Italy 10 .6 17,655 17,655
Netherlands NA NA 33,994 47,069
Scotland NA NA 24,842 NA
Switzerland 27 1.6 48,869 48,869 __
Israel 1 1 0.6 NA NA
Estonia NA NA 12,000 8,000
Brazil NA NA 20,032 20,032
Colombia NA NA NA 16,000
Mexico NA NA 10,843 13,292
Rep. of China NA NA 28,266 16,366
INDIA 5 0.3 3,638 4,316
Note: Data refer to 1996-98 averages.
Source. Adapted from Rubin (1999).
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Table 10: GATS Commitments on Mode 1 and 2 in Selected Service Sectors
|~~~~Nme of X SuX: (% C 0 /w$E'>|
_~~~~~~~~~~FI Part NoE J< lI PB rt: _o
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 74 19 17 64 14 10 76
COMPUTER AND RELATED
SERVICES
a. Consultancy service related to the 51 57 20 24 51 22 27
installation of computer hardware
b. Software implementation 56 54 27 20 48 29 23
c. Data processing 54 54 26 20 46 31 22
1 Full: full commitment; Part: partial commitment; No: no commitment.
Note: Percentage may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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Table 11: Current and Recommended Negotiating and Domestic Policy Positions
| Iisie Cur tp it:a Rded
Industrial Reluctant but willing to Reduce own bound and actual tariffs and seek to reduce
tariffs accept negotiations tariffs in other countries, especially in textiles, clothing
and footwear.
Agriculture Seeking the flexibility to End policies which discriminate against agriculture. Push
protect domestic agriculture for liberalization on a global basis and consider joining
while pushing for Cairns group.
liberalization abroad
Services Defensive position in relation Further domestic liberalization, emphasizing competition
to opening domestic services more than a change of ownership, and greater use of
markets, while pushing for GATS to precommit o future liberalization. Create inter-
increased mobility for modal negotiating linkages to enhance access for
individual service suppliers individual service suppliers. Strengthen domestic
regulations and push for stronger multilateral disciplines
on regulatory barriers to trade.
Electronic Initially opposed but now Current decision has little meaning since quotas and
commerce willing to support decision discriminatory internal taxation are still permitted in
not to impose customs duties. many cases. Therefore, widen and deepen scope of cross-
border supply commitments under GATS on market
access (prohibiting quotas) and national treatment
(prohibiting discriminatory taxation) to ensure current
openness continues in areas of export interest like
software and database services.
TRIPs Seeking general provisions Change draft IP legislation to ensure that TRIPs benefits
on transfer of technology and can be withdrawn in the event of noncompliance by
increased protection for partners with commitments that affect India's exports.
traditional knowledge and Institute workable systems for protecting traditional
bioresources. knowledge domestically in order to seek their replication
internationally. Use new competition policy, and
judicious use of compulsory licensing, to mitigate the
egregious impacts of the TRIPs agreement.
Preferential In favor of strengthening Argue for inclusion of compensation provision for third
agreements rules countries adversely affected by trade-diversion.
Competition Opposed Strengthen domestic competition policy and be open to
policy the development of meaningful multilateral disciplines,
which ideally would also cover anti-dumping
Standards Pushing for inclusion in Strengthen disciplines on MRAs to ensure that they are
MRAs non-discriminatory. Push for multilateral disciplines on
Opposed to labour standards domestic regulations in goods and services based on the
necessity test. Improve domestic standards. And on
labor standards, be proactive in the ILO while resisting
___________ __________ 
attempts to bring the issue into the WTO.
Government Opposed Be open to creation of multilateral disciplines, but link to
procurement the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and services,
so that foreign procurement contracts can be contested in
areas of comparative advantage, such as labor services.
Investment Opposed Be willing to discuss multilateral disciplines, but examine
case for preserving discretion beyond that provided by
strengthened competition policy.
Anti-dumping Seeking to limit scope for Curtail domestic use of anti-dumping. Argue for drastic
foreign action. reform of multilateral anti-dumping rules to eliminate
current protectionist use, ideally by subjecting them to
competition policy.
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